

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



4 January 1963

Copy No. ED-6

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

4 January 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

4. East-West Germany: GDR revives its 1960 confederative union proposal. (Page 5)

5. Laos: Pathet Lao split over how control of Laos should be won. (Page 6)

7. Peru: Communist groups join forces to carry out further violence and subversion. (Page 8)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

\*East-West Germany: On the eve of its party congress, the first since the Berlin Wall, the East German regime has revived its 1960 proposal for a carefully phased confederative union with the Federal Republic.

In an editorial signed by its deputy editor, Neues Deutschland on 3 January called for "compromises in the solution of the German question on the lines of the policy of understanding in the Caribbean area."

Starting with the assumption that the end of the Adenauer era removes one bar to reunification, the editorial suggests that Ulbricht need not be an impediment to closer East-West German relations.

The editorial follows Khrushchev's 24 December letter to Adenauer in which he charged that the chancellor alone of the world's leaders failed to grasp the significance of Cuba. Neues Deutschland claims that Bonn must conclude that "the policy of strength has come to an end and it has become unavoidable to adjust oneself to peaceful coexistence between the two German states." It argues that "the most suitable form of realizing peaceful coexistence in Germany is a confederation of the two German states which might also be joined by a free city of West Berlin."

Finally it concludes that existing trade relations between East and West Germany provide a basis for rapprochement between the two governments. Consistent with the bloc's post-Cuba line, Neues Deutschland pays only perfunctory attention to the question of a peace treaty.

25X1  
[Redacted]  
Laos: The Pathet Lao leadership appears to be split over the tactics to be used to win control of Laos.

A "soft-line" faction led by Prince Souphanouvong is opposed by a "hard-line" group, whose spokesman is Minister of Information Phoumi Vongvichit but whose real leaders are probably long-time Communists Nouhak Phoumsavan and Kaysone Phomvihan.


Souphanouvong reportedly holds that the Pathet Lao should follow Soviet advice and try to win Laos through political means, without resorting to warfare. Armed force should be used only in response to a rightist military initiative.

The more militant faction, convinced that a victory by political means would be long delayed at best, maintains that the Pathet Lao should use its superior military strength to impose its control.

25X1  
[Redacted]

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

25X1



Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

**Peru:** Communist groups in Peru are joining forces to carry out further violence and subversion.

The US Embassy at Lima states that it has new evidence that the main Peruvian Communist splinter groups have set aside the differences which in the past have prevented them from taking joint action. They now appear to have accepted the extreme revolutionary views of the more activist Trotskyites. Cubans and other Latin American nationals, as well as Peruvians, trained in subversion by Havana and Moscow, are believed to have been instrumental in this development.

The governing junta apparently plans to deploy federal troops in areas of rural unrest, but it remains unclear whether the junta is genuinely prepared to take forceful measures against the Communists to prevent further outbreaks. The government is aware of the Communist activity but has publicly placed responsibility for recent disorders on the APRA party.

25X1

25X1

25X1  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 3 January 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 24-63: "Implications of the Center-Left Experiment in Italy"

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

    Special Counsel to the President

    The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

    The Scientific Adviser to the President

    The Director of the Budget

    The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

    The Secretary of State

    The Under Secretary of State

    The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

    The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

    The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

    The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

    The Secretary of the Treasury

    The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

    The Secretary of Defense

    The Deputy Secretary of Defense

    The Secretary of the Army

    The Secretary of the Navy

    The Secretary of the Air Force

    The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

    The Assistant Secretary of Defense

    The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

    Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

    Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

    Chief of Staff, United States Army

    Commandant, United States Marine Corps

    U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

    Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

    Commander in Chief, Pacific

    Commander in Chief, Atlantic

    The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

    The Director, The Joint Staff

    The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

    The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

    The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

    The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

    The Attorney General

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation

        The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

        The Chairman

The National Security Agency

        The Director

The United States Information Agency

        The Director

The National Indications Center

        The Director

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800030001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA RDP79T0075A006800030001-3

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA RDP79T0075A006800030001-3

**TOP SECRET**